The US, Israel, and Iran: A Shared Goal, Diverging Strategies

The US and Israel are two close allies with somewhat different interests when it comes to Iran, but their strategies converge on one core point: Iran’s nuclear program. Both countries agree that Iran must never possess a nuclear weapon, which they view as an imminent threat to their national security. This shared position has shaped both the 12-day and 40-day wars with Iran, which the US and Israel waged with the aim of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, both above and below ground, and weakening its broader military capabilities. Each country has other strategic goals as well, but these have taken a back seat to the overriding objective of eliminating the nuclear program.

Iran’s proxies, along with its well-established drone and missile capabilities, represent another layer of imminent threat to US interests in the region and to Israel, which sits within easy striking distance. Here, however, the two allies diverged: Israel hoped to escalate the conflict to the point of regime change, while the US soon concluded that Iran was not an easy opponent and that regime change was not a viable option. Israel launched the 12-day war, the US backed it with the Midnight Hammer operation, and then encouraged Israel to stand down once Iran’s nuclear facilities, if not the nuclear program itself, had suffered massive damage, which the US president hoped would be enough to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The US and Israel then jointly launched the 40-day war. But Iranian resilience, the heavy toll on Gulf states, and mounting pressure on the global economy from rising oil prices, driven by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, combined with the absence of any sign of regime collapse or public uprising, pushed the US toward diplomacy. This shift also suited Iran. At this point, Israel began to grow anxious, recognizing that a wounded snake is more dangerous than an unharmed one. Yet Tel Aviv lacks the military strength to continue the war with Iran alone. There is less doubt that a nuclear-armed Israel would feel more confident and secure than Iran in an all-out war. But once the US made its decision, Israel had to accept that the conflict would not achieve its strategic goals, and that Washington had no appetite to continue fighting the way that Israel wishes.

Even so, neither Iran’s nuclear future, nor the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, nor the prospects for a lasting ceasefire followed by a peace agreement is clear. What remains are a few speculations about where this conflict may be headed. On Saturday, August 1, the US president called off the next round of strikes on Iran, strikes that had been aimed at key energy infrastructure and would have marked the deadliest attack of the campaign. Several Gulf states, Saudi Arabia among them, along with Pakistan as the key mediator, urged the US to halt the attack.

These Gulf states are convinced that such air campaigns will not topple the regime, and that they themselves would bear the cost of Iranian counterstrikes on their infrastructure and citizens. Israel, for its part, did not take part in the US strikes over the past two weeks, judging that a limited war was not worth the cost, nor does it see reopening the Strait of Hormuz as a pressing security concern of its own. Notably, Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait struck Iranian proxies in Iraq during this same period, adding a new dimension to an already complicated conflict.

This is not a major shift in alignment, however: Saudi Arabia still favors a US-Iran peace agreement over a costly war with no clear outcome, one it might well be drawn into itself. From what they learned in the Yemen war, Saudi Arabia is aware that a war with Iran would put an already fragile region under even more pressure, will waste more resources and is going to be a long-lasting security concern.

Still, a pattern in the US war strategy against Iran is gradually taking shape: a decisive victory is not achievable, and Iran is unlikely to bow easily to US terms. So instead, the US is raising the cost of war for Iran through intermittent coercive air campaigns, a blockade on Iran’s oil exports and ports, and sustained high-pressure sanctions. Why this strategy of strike-and-hold?

Iran’s long-term resilience is eroding not from any single blow but under the cumulative weight of many pressures at once: sustained military attrition, weakening regional allies, economic deterioration, domestic unrest, political fragmentation, shrinking missile and drone stockpiles, and continued US and Israeli pressure.

All of these are steadily reducing Tehran’s capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict. The Strait of Hormuz remains a powerful tool for inflicting short-term economic and geopolitical disruption, but it is not a sustainable source of leverage, since prolonged closure damages Iran’s own economy, and regional states are increasingly developing alternative trade and energy routes that reduce Tehran’s strategic hold over the waterway. Iraq’s oil exports via Syria and Turkey are a clear example of this trend.

That said, the US is well aware that a prolonged war with Iran aimed at regime change would require boots on the ground, working with Kurds, Balochis, and Arabs who have arms and may have the will to fight against the regime, provided their future share of power is supported by the US and regional countries.

However, Turkey’s leader, who has a close relationship with the US president, is opposed to a scenario in which Kurds lead the ground operation against the regime, since it may have consequences for Turkey’s peace process with the PKK, as well as for the situation in Syria, where Kurds are supposed to integrate into the new regime’s institutions.

Pakistan also feels a security threat from Baloch involvement in such a conflict, since it has the same concern and oppresses its own Baloch population. Another major problem is that US foreign policy under President Trump has no interest in working with groups or parties affiliated with minorities interested in democratization and power-sharing.

US foreign policy clearly favors strong central governments allied with the US, even if achieving that means sacrificing the groups it used to work with. The case of Syria and the Kurdish-led SDF is an example of this foreign policy. Vital to mention that a long war with such a goal would drag in Iran’s regional proxies and would pull the Houthis of Yemen into the conflict, risking the closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb waterway. It could also spill into Iraq and Lebanon, both of which are currently working to strengthen their governments and disarm their militias.

Ultimately, the main reason Iran entered initial negotiations with the US is that Tehran, too, recognizes how costly this war has become, and the country has already suffered massive damage. The US president, meanwhile, is under his own pressure from the War Powers Resolution and the limits it places on sustained military action without congressional authorization. The Trump administration interprets the resolution in a way that treats each new round of strikes on Iran as opening a fresh 60-day clock.

Therefore, the US will hope, via intermittent coercive air campaigns, to raise the cost of war for Iran and bring it to the negotiating table, since the country is under a number of serious pressures. What we see now is a cycle of strikes and negotiations until an agreement is reached seems viable.