Is the Legal System Enough to Disarm Iraqi Militias?

Before 2003, Iraq had no armed groups operating outside state control. Although the regime relied on multiple competing security apparatuses, each was formal, strictly regulated, and subservient to the central government. The post-2003 landscape, however, saw a rapid proliferation of non-state armed actors, most of whom justified their existence under the banner of resisting US-led forces.

In many Sunni-majority cities, American troops faced insurgencies involving former officers from the Iraqi army, which had been disbanded by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Some of these insurgent factions were radical extremists like al-Qaeda in Iraq—a group whose influence waned significantly after 2007, when local Sunni Awakening Forces mobilized against them due to the immense devastation they brought to Sunni communities.

Shiite armed groups followed a different trajectory, navigating a mix of tactical cooperation and violent resistance toward the US military presence. In both cases, Iran provided critical weaponry, funding, and logistical backing. For example, the Badr Brigade—the armed wing of the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq, originally formed by Iraqi dissidents in Iran during the 1980s—had fought alongside the Iranian military against Iraq during the 1980–1988 war.

After 2003, Badr formally integrated into the newly established Iraqi army and police forces. Concurrently, the Mahdi Army, a powerful Shiite militia led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, engaged in direct military clashes with US forces. Over time, Sadr’s movement established a dominant political party while quietly preserving its armed network.

In subsequent years, additional Shiite armed factions were formed under Tehran’s guidance to consolidate Iranian influence over Iraq. While many of these groups emerged around the 2011 US military withdrawal, they initially lacked popular legitimacy and formal state recognition. The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 changed everything, providing these militias a unique opportunity to cultivate a “sacred” status as the nation’s saviors. When ISIS fighters swept through Iraqi military lines and captured roughly half the country—including Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and parts of Diyala and Kirkuk—Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a famous fatwa calling on citizens to bear arms in defense of the homeland.

Exploiting this mobilization, various armed factions coalesced into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF was soon given official status as an umbrella security organ reporting nominally to the Prime Minister. By leveraging this legal umbrella, militia leaders successfully established political wings, secured parliamentary seats, and embedded themselves within the state structure, ultimately becoming the dominant political and military power brokers in Iraq.

Compounding Threats

Since the defeat of ISIS in 2017–2018, the PMF and its affiliated militias have claimed primary credit for the victory, overshadowing the critical contributions of conventional Iraqi armed forces and the US-led international coalition. Building on this prestige, these groups expanded their grip over Iraq’s political institutions, intelligence networks, and lucrative economic sectors, marking the peak of Iranian influence in the country. This systemic militia dominance coincided with rampant state corruption and severe economic degradation.

By October 2019, deep public frustration erupted into mass youth-led demonstrations across Baghdad and Shiite-majority southern cities. Protesters directly challenged the post-2003 political order, demanding an end to systemic corruption, poor public services, and foreign intervention—chiefly from Iran. Viewing these protests as an existential threat to their power, militia groups responded with brutal violence. Armed factions killed, kidnapped, and tortured hundreds of demonstrators with near-total impunity. Yet despite the crackdowns, relentless street pressure forced Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi to resign, leading to the appointment of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the former intelligence chief, as Prime Minister.

Attempting to address public demands for accountability, the Kadhimi government arrested a prominent militia commander implicated in targeted killings of activists. In a blunt show of force, dozens of heavily armed militants surrounded the Green Zone, blocking key government entrances and surrounding state offices. The display forced the government to release the commander and served as a stark warning to top officials against attempting to rein in militia power.

Laws on Paper

From a purely constitutional standpoint, Iraqi prime ministers should not need to negotiate with militias or offer political concessions in exchange for disarmament. Iraq’s foundational legal framework is entirely unambiguous on this point. Article 9 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution explicitly bans the formation of military militias outside the framework of the official armed forces. Complementing this constitutional prohibition, the Anti-Terrorism Law (No. 13 of 2005) mandates life imprisonment or the death penalty for anyone who establishes, commands, or participates in an armed group designed to terrorize citizens or destabilize national security outside state authority. Furthermore, electoral legislation strictly prohibits political parties that maintain armed wings or paramilitary branches from competing for office.

Despite these clear statutory prohibitions, successive Iraqi administrations have proven unable to enforce the law against groups that operate effectively above the judicial system. Legal texts alone cannot disarm these factions because their existence is inextricably linked to the political survival of their leaders and Iran’s strategic calculus, which views Iraq as a forward defense line and a geopolitical buffer zone.

Recent pressure from Washington has brought this dilemma back to the forefront. American officials have insisted that the Iraqi government take concrete steps to disarm non-state actors, offering backing to leaders who show a willingness to assert state sovereignty. Armed with this implicit backing, prime ministers have repeatedly issued deadlines for paramilitary groups to surrender their weapons or face classification as outlaw organizations. However, militia leaders routinely dismiss these ultimatums. Representatives of major factions have warned that any coercive action by the state will trigger violent pushback—putting the government’s stability, its legal authority, and its international partnerships at risk.

Road Ahead

Whether any Iraqi administration can successfully disarm these groups depends far less on domestic legal mechanisms and far more on regional dynamics—specifically the trajectory of US-Iran confrontations and the future of Iranian power projection. Because these militias operate under direct guidance from Iran’s senior leadership and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), their ultimate fate rests largely on decisions made in Tehran. While these factions maintain local political and economic roots, they also serve broader regional functions: coordinating with regional proxy networks and targeting opposition forces during periods of heightened international tension.

Even if a diplomatic or political breakthrough leads to a partial surrender of arms, there is little guarantee that full disarmament would occur. Militia representatives have repeatedly hinted that while they might hand over standard small arms to state custody, they intend to retain advanced weaponry—including long-range drones, guided rockets, and sophisticated intelligence gear—in covert caches beyond the government’s reach.

Such political maneuvers put Iraq in a perilous position. Failing to take credible steps toward disarming militias leaves the country vulnerable to severe economic fallout, potential international sanctions, and political isolation. If an Iraqi prime minister fails to demonstrate real progress, Washington and other key partners may come to view the government as either ineffective or implicitly aligned with Tehran, threatening vital financial arrangements—such as central bank access to US dollar reserves derived from oil sales. Ultimately, as long as these groups remain tied to regional power dynamics, written laws will remain an insufficient tool for bringing Iraq’s militias under the authority of the state.