Houthis to The Pundit: Bab al-Mandab Is Yemen’s, and Red Sea Decisions Are Ours

Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, the Houthis, does not regard Bab al-Mandab as an Iranian strategic asset and did not close the crucial waterway during the recent war on Iran because Tehran was capable of defending itself, a senior Houthi official told The Pundit, offering one of the clearest accounts yet of how the movement says it distinguishes its own military calculations from those of Iran.

Mohammed al-Farah, a member of Ansar Allah’s political bureau, told The Pundit that decisions concerning Bab al-Mandab and Yemen’s territorial waters are made in Sanaa according to Yemeni interests and broader political priorities, rather than automatically following decisions in Tehran.

“Control of Bab al-Mandab and the protection of Yemeni territorial waters is an inherent Yemeni sovereign right,” al-Farah said. The strait, he added, “is not managed on behalf of any other state, nor can it be granted to any external party.”

Bab al-Mandab

The statement addresses one of the central questions surrounding Ansar Allah’s relationship with Iran: why the group was prepared to use its position overlooking the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab extensively during the Gaza war, while refraining from closing the strait when Iran itself came under attack.

Al-Farah argued that the difference was intentional.

Iran, he said, is a state with extensive missiles, military capabilities and its own means of deterrence, and therefore did not require Yemen to fight the war on its behalf. Gaza, by contrast, involved a population under siege and a Palestinian armed movement facing overwhelming Israeli military power backed by the United States and other Western governments.

For Ansar Allah, he said, this distinction justified direct Yemeni intervention in support of Gaza without creating an automatic obligation to reproduce the same strategy whenever Iran entered a confrontation.

“The fact that Bab al-Mandab was not closed simply because Iran was subjected to aggression confirms that the military decision in Sanaa is not an automatic decision subordinate to Tehran,” al-Farah said.

He nevertheless acknowledged continuing coordination with Iran and other members of what Ansar Allah calls the “Axis of Jihad and Resistance,” saying the Houthis remained in contact with allied fronts during the Iranian confrontation and were prepared to intervene if circumstances required it.

Al-Farah also made a broader statement that could have implications beyond Iran, saying Ansar Allah would not accept the use of the Red Sea to attack an Arab or Muslim country and could respond militarily.

“We have made our position clear that any targeting of an Arab or Islamic country through the Red Sea is something we will not accept,” he said, adding that the movement would take “a military position if necessary.”

At the same time, al-Farah described Iran as an important regional counterweight rather than a power entitled to dictate Yemen’s policies.

He said Iranian resilience against the United States and its allies could constrain American and Israeli power and give regional states greater room to pursue independent policies. Yet he rejected replacing Western influence with Iranian tutelage.

“We do not receive orders from any other state,” al-Farah said. “The independence of the Yemeni national decision has been paid for with blood, and it cannot be surrendered.”

Ansar Allah’s relationship with Iran, he said, is an acknowledged alliance based on political convergence over Israel, Palestine and opposition to U.S. regional dominance. He described it as an alliance “between equals,” rejecting Saudi accusations that the movement functions as an Iranian proxy.

To illustrate the point, al-Farah repeatedly contrasted the Houthis’ stated demands with Iranian interests.

“When we demanded the opening of airports, we demanded the opening of Sanaa airport. We did not demand the opening of Mehrabad or Tehran’s airports,” he said. “When we demanded the opening of ports, we demanded Yemeni ports, not Iranian ports.”

The same applied, he said, to demands for the release of prisoners and access to national resources.

The Unfinished Saudi-Yemeni Settlement

According to al-Farah, the Houthis’ latest attacks against Saudi Arabia were not carried out to defend Iran’s nuclear program or its regional interests. He instead described them as part of the unresolved Yemeni conflict and a response to renewed Saudi action against Sanaa airport and Hodeidah port.

Al-Farah said Saudi Arabia had effectively determined the timing of the renewed confrontation when it struck Sanaa airport as a civilian aircraft carrying patients, wounded passengers and members of a delegation returning from Iran was arriving.

He claimed that more than 200 people aboard the aircraft were endangered.

Saudi strikes on Hodeidah port, he said, reinforced the Houthi conclusion that the period of de-escalation had failed.

According to al-Farah, Ansar Allah had deliberately postponed a major response while prioritizing its campaign in support of Gaza and waiting for the Saudi-Yemeni negotiating track to produce results.

He said Sanaa had spent nearly four years waiting for movement on prisoners, salaries, reconstruction, the economy and the reopening of airports and ports.

The Houthis participated in direct negotiations with Saudi officials, including talks following the arrival of a Saudi delegation led by Ambassador Mohammed al-Jaber in Sanaa in 2023, al-Farah said. Further talks took place in Muscat, Sanaa and Riyadh under Omani mediation without Iranian participation, which he presented as further evidence that the movement could negotiate independently of Tehran.

Al-Farah accused Riyadh of subsequently using the de-escalation period to reorganize its position rather than implement a peace agreement.

The Houthi official placed economic questions at the center of the dispute.

He said the movement considers restrictions on Hodeidah port, the limited operation of Sanaa airport, the division of Yemen’s banking system, unpaid public-sector salaries and control of national oil and gas revenues components of what it describes as a continuing blockade.

According to al-Farah, the transfer of Central Bank functions from Sanaa to Aden in 2016 affected salaries for more than 1.2 million public employees. He also claimed inspections and delays affecting imports through Hodeidah can dramatically increase the final cost of goods.

These figures and allegations represent Ansar Allah’s account of the economic impact of the conflict.

Al-Farah also rejected allegations that continued Iranian weapons smuggling explains the Houthis’ expanding missile and drone arsenal.

He claimed that Ansar Allah has developed local engineering and military capabilities capable of rebuilding and producing missile systems, drones and air defenses inside Yemen.

The movement’s development of such weapons under wartime conditions, he argued, demonstrated growing domestic military capacity rather than dependence on continuous Iranian shipments.

The interview also addressed the widening political differences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over Yemen.

Asked about reports of Emirati weapons appearing in Houthi-controlled territory and a separate allegation that Ansar Allah had previously rejected an Emirati request to strike Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project, al-Farah did not directly confirm or deny those specific claims.

He instead characterized the Saudi-Emirati dispute as a competition over territory, oil-producing regions, ports, maritime access and strategic influence inside Yemen.

“The Saudi-Emirati disagreement is, at its core, a conflict over narrow interests and an attempt to divide influence over Yemeni geography,” al-Farah said.

He pointed particularly to competition over southern and eastern oil-producing governorates, ports and maritime corridors, including Bab al-Mandab.

Al-Farah then offered a sharper political characterization, saying the two Gulf states were also competing over “who implements American dictates and directives more than the other.”

Ansar Allah would not, he said, allow its military decisions to become subordinate to the rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

A Role for Egypt

Beyond the regional confrontation, al-Farah provided a relatively detailed account of the political settlement the Houthis say they would accept inside Yemen.

The movement wants a “Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue” bringing together the country’s major political forces without foreign supervision, he said.

Al-Farah outlined four broad elements: an end to foreign military involvement and restrictions imposed on Yemen; an inclusive domestic political dialogue; creation of a state based on institutions, legal authority and political partnership; and establishment of a unified national army capable of defending Yemen’s borders and political independence.

He also called for transparent management of oil, gas and port revenues and what he described as equitable distribution of national wealth among Yemen’s governorates.

The Houthi official rejected claims that Ansar Allah refuses political dialogue or lacks domestic legitimacy, pointing to mass demonstrations in Houthi-controlled areas as evidence of public backing for the movement’s military policy.

He was considerably more hostile toward the internationally recognized Yemeni authorities and other anti-Houthi groups, accusing them of dependence on Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Those claims remain at the center of Yemen’s unresolved struggle over political legitimacy and are rejected by Ansar Allah’s Yemeni opponents.

Al-Farah’s comments on Egypt were markedly different from his language toward Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

He described Cairo as a pillar of Arab national security and praised Egypt for not becoming deeply militarily involved in Yemen despite its formal participation in the Saudi-led coalition beginning in 2015.

“We appreciate Egypt’s lack of direct involvement in the Yemeni quagmire and its continued balanced position calling for a political solution and preservation of Yemen’s unity,” he said.

Al-Farah said Ansar Allah would welcome an Egyptian diplomatic initiative capable of contributing to ending the war, easing restrictions and sponsoring an inclusive Yemeni political dialogue.

He also sought to address Egyptian concerns over Red Sea instability directly.

Ansar Allah’s operations around the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab “are not directed against any Arab country, including Egypt,” al-Farah said.

The movement, he said, regards Egypt’s security and Yemen’s security as interconnected and sees Cairo as potentially capable of playing a mediating role that other regional powers cannot.

Taken together, al-Farah’s statements reveal the political case Ansar Allah is now attempting to make as Yemen again becomes entangled with wider regional confrontation.

The Houthis are not distancing themselves from Iran. On the contrary, al-Farah openly defended the alliance and described Iranian power as a useful counterweight to U.S. and Israeli dominance.

The distinction he sought to establish is between alliance and command.

In Ansar Allah’s telling, Gaza can trigger one military calculation, Iran another; Bab al-Mandab can be mobilized for a Palestinian cause without becoming an Iranian-controlled strategic weapon; Saudi-Emirati differences can be exploited politically without dictating Houthi military choices; and relations with Tehran can coexist with direct negotiations with Riyadh and a request for Egyptian mediation.

Whether the movement’s adversaries accept that distinction is another question. The significance of al-Farah’s statements is that Ansar Allah is making it explicitly: its regional alliances may help shape its worldview, while Sanaa insists the decisions over Yemen’s territory, its missiles and drones, and one of the world’s most strategically important waterways will remain its own.