Kurds and the War: No One’s Trojan Horse, but Odysseus’s Will to Return

These days, movie lovers and fans of Christopher Nolan are busy discussing his new film, The Odyssey, adapted from the famous epic by the Greek poet Homer, while figuring out how to watch it in IMAX 70MM for the broadest, most detailed picture. This short piece uses the analogy of that story to describe the case of the Kurds, both in the broad sense of a greater Kurdistan divided between Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and, more specifically, with a focus on Rojhelat (the eastern part of Kurdistan in Iran) in the current conflict between the US-Israel and Iran.

I remain more committed to the original epic than to the film. Important to mention that this piece is using Odysseus as illuminating rather than as a perfect fit. In addition to last point, the Odysseus is an individual while the case of the Kurds is about a nation and its political parties, which may look like a stretch when measured against a single mythic hero, but the parallel holds at the level of trajectory and character rather than literal scale. Finally, while the piece mentions the case of the Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan, its aim and scope focus mainly on Rojhelat, the part of Kurdistan that is in Iran.

Since the 40-day war with Iran broke out, we have heard the name of the Kurds, generally, and of the Kurds of Rojhelat, particularly, more often, from all sides of the conflict and from countries not directly involved in this war, such as Turkey. Indirectly, though, they wield massive influence over the policies of the countries engaged.

President Trump has spoken about the Kurds several times without mentioning a specific Kurdish party; Israel apparently had a plan to work with the Rojhelati Kurds (Iran) that was taken off the table due to Turkish and US opposition; and Iran has targeted them not only rhetorically but also practically, striking Bashure (Kurdistan Region of Iraq where Kurdish parties of Rojhelat reside) with drones and missiles almost 1,000 times since then. Pro-Iranian Iraqi militias have also taken part in the rhetorical, propaganda, and military campaign against the Kurds, targeting the Kurdistan Region and Kurdish parties’ camps as part of Iran’s broader anti-Kurdistan strikes accusing them as regional collaborators of the US and Israel.

There are seven Kurdish political parties from Rojhelat (eastern Kurdistan) that Iran labels “anti-revolutionary” or “separatist,”(tajziyeh-talab) as a delegitimizing label for Kurdish movements. Monarchists and Iranian nationalists commonly use the same “separatist” label to rally people around nationalist sentiment against the Kurdish national movement. Kurdish nationalists seeking statehood instead tend to describe their objective in terms of independence or national self-determination.

However, in reality, only one of these parties, the smallest, Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), clearly advocates for the decolonization, and independence of Kurdistan. The rest(Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala of the Toilers of KurdistanOrganization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle or Khabat) mainly advocate for a federal system of power-sharing within a democratic Iran. Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the eastern wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), advocates for a democratic society in Iran in which all groups have equal rights and can live together peacefully.

They do not advocate for federal or confederal systems of power-sharing as we know, but instead have their own imaginary decentralization model, called democratic confederalism. This idea was formulated by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in a Turkish prison for about 27 years. It is a non-state, grassroots political model that prioritizes local self-governance, direct democracy, gender equality, and ecological sustainability, while rejecting all conventional political systems, including the nation-state, federation, confederation, and consociationalism models.

There is also a decolonization movement spread throughout all parts of Kurdistan, which, as the Turkish sociologist İsmail Beşikçi articulated in his work International Colony Kurdistan, views Kurdistan as a colony divided among Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

To expand its influence and control the situation through its intelligence services and military operations, Iran also maintains close relations with its collaborators in Rojhelat through IRGC and Basij and in Bashur (the southern part of Kurdistan, or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq) through The Ramezan Corps within the IRGC’s Quds Force. Dividing the Kurds and ruling over them is another way the states that partitioned Kurdistan maintain control over it. Kurds call these collaborators Jash, literally meaning “donkey foal,” a term meaning “traitor” to the Kurds and the Kurdistan national movement, for working on behalf of Tehran and Ankara.

The Trojan Horse Logic

Interestingly, since the war began, each of the main actors in this conflict, including Turkey as an influential regional actor, has described the Kurds of all parts of Kurdistan in terms that appear neutral but effectively cast them as a Trojan horse, or a military instrument serving the specific purposes of external powers. They point to how the US worked with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in Rojava (the western part of Kurdistan in Syria) and then, once its goals were achieved and a strong, pro-Turkey central power emerged, abandoned them. That was a devastating moment for the autonomous region of Rojava.

President Trump has accused the Kurds of keeping American weapons for themselves instead of delivering them into Iran to the opposition and to the people fighting the Islamic regime, who were under suppression during the January 2026 uprising.No Kurdish parties confirmed receiving them. On March 5, 2026, before President Trump made the April accusation, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt was asked about reports that the CIA would provide weapons to Iranian Kurdish groups. She acknowledged that Trump had spoken with Kurdish leaders but said: “any report suggesting that the president has agreed to any such plan is false and should not be written.”

There was also a significant statement from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. When asked about reports that the administration was considering arming Iranian Kurdish groups, he said: “None of our objectives are premised on the support or the arming of any particular force.” The White House also stated on March 5 that reports claiming Trump had agreed to a plan to arm Kurdish forces were “false.” However, on May 11, President Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House, again accused “the Kurds” of keeping weapons that the United States had intended for Iranian protesters during the January uprising. He said: “So I am very disappointed in the Kurds.”

However, even if we accept that guns were delivered to the Kurds of Rojhelat, are they not being imagined as a Trojan horse through which the Iranian people were meant to be armed against the regime from within? Here, Kurdish agency is reduced to that of a delivery service. How were the Kurds supposed to know who was eligible to receive the guns? How were they supposed to transfer them into Iran while the country’s borders are monitored around the clock? Why should they risk their lives on such a mission for an uncertain future, stepping into a bloody hell, when they might be left with nothing to show for it but thousands of casualties and massive damage to the Kurdistan resistance movement and civil society in Rojhelat? These questions have no clear answer, unless the Kurds are simply being treated as a Trojan horse, or as someone else’s army to call on when needed.

There were reports that Israel, with US support, had developed a plan to arm Kurdish opposition groups and facilitate their entry into Rojhelat from the Kurdistan Region. The initial plan originated with Israel. Early accounts gave the impression that the immediate objective was for Kurdish forces to seize and hold Kurdish-majority territory by driving out Iranian security forces.Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that control of Rojhelat was not intended to be the ultimate objective.

Rather, a successful Kurdish offensive was expected to “break the fear barrier” by demonstrating the regime’s vulnerability and encouraging other suppressed nations and opposition forces across Iran to rise up, expel government forces from their own regions, and thereby accelerate the fragmentation and eventual collapse of the Islamic Republic.

Later Israeli reporting presented an even more ambitious version of the plan: Kurdish forces would establish an initial foothold in Rojhelat, attract additional fighters and popular support inside Iran, and then transform the operation into a broader advance toward Tehran. In this scenario, the Kurdish offensive would serve as the starting point for a nationwide uprising and ultimately contribute to regime change, rather than simply the separation or liberation of Kurdistan.

In Rojava, the Kurds took control of their region and, with US support, established the multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which defeated ISIS with the help of US air cover and captured further territory. None of this, however, translated into a lasting political achievement (a genuine share of power that would guarantee the status of their autonomous region) once the US and Turkey decided to back HTS and al-Sharaa after the fall of the Assad regime.

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi publicly stated in March 2025 that the Syrian Kurds would welcome assistance from any country willing to support Kurdish rights and protect their achievements, explicitly indicating that this openness extended to Israel. Israel, too, stayed silent and chose to overlook the Kurds. In this way, the Kurds were treated as a military tool and the Trojan horse of the war, a campaign against ISIS that, through March 2019, cost them approximately 11,000 fighters killed and more than 21,000 wounded. As a result, their autonomous region was dissolved, and they were forced to integrate into new social, political, and military institutions.

Israel, too, clearly sees the Kurds as a Trojan horse for a military plan, with no clear sign of a genuine strategic alliance. The Mossad official who had worked on the project of arming the Rojhelat Kurds was later dismissed after the project failed to achieve its goals. Clearly, it was not a strategic plan but rather a tactic to provoke the Iranian regime with the Kurdish forces. It has proven extremely costly for the Kurds: under this very accusation, Kurdish anti-regime parties have been targeted relentlessly and brutally by drones and missiles in the Kurdistan region of Bashur.

Both the US and Israel spoke of their plan to work with the Kurds, but it never materialized in reality, leaving the Kurds vulnerable to Iranian strikes that have since cost dozens of casualties and caused massive damage to the Kurdistan region and to Kurdish parties’ military bases and civilian camps. However, there is a clear desire among Kurdish political parties and the broader Kurdish national movement to work with the United States if the war reaches a point at which Kurdish forces could advance into Rojhelat.

Surprisingly, Turkey and Iran, both of which have a long history of suppression and assimilation against the Kurds of all parts of Kurdistan, also see the Kurds as the Trojan horse of Israel and the US. They regard the Kurds as a security threat.

Against their claims, the Turkish sociologist İsmail Beşikçi wrote on the states that divided Kurdistan:

“[They] will never govern the Kurds justly. They rule them, and will always rule them, through chemical and biological warfare, poisonous gases, oppression, and tyranny. They frequently uproot them from their homes and banish them to the desert. They use every possible means to exterminate Kurdish identity: exile, the breaking up of families, the terrorizing of children, forcing people to live in a state of panic. They destroy Kurdistan’s natural resources, its forests, its fields, its animals and birds, through chemicals and poisonous gases.”

These states either continue striking the Kurds regardless of the situation, or, as in the current peace process between Turkey and the PKK, seek assurances that the Kurds will not act against the security of the very states that have done these terrible things to them. Branding them the Trojan horse of others serves as a justification for targeting the Kurds as a security threat to the territorial integrity of Iran and Turkey. Iran now uses this to justify striking the Kurds and arresting and executing Kurdish activists on charges of espionage for Israel and the US.

A particularly clear case occurred on June 25, 2025, immediately after the 12-day war. Iran executed three Kurdish men—Edris Ali, Azad Shojaei, and Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul—in Urmia. Iranian authorities accused them of collaborating with Israel and transporting equipment allegedly connected to the 2020 assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Reuters reported the executions as part of a much broader postwar crackdown, noting that more than 700 people had been arrested on political or security charges, many for alleged espionage, while Kurdish regions experienced particularly heavy security measures.

Odysseus, Not a Proxy

However, this is only how the enemies of the Kurds, and their allies, choose to see them. The Kurds’ enemies find such accusations a convenient way to advance their political agenda, engaging the Kurds on these terms so they can divide and rule while continuing their oppression. Contrary to what they claim, the Kurds are no one’s Trojan horse; rather, they are Odysseus, gathering all the strength and tools he needs to return home to his beloved wife, son, and homeland.

A defining feature of Odysseus is his resilience and endurance: he suffers shipwrecks, captivity, and the loss of all his men, yet keeps pushing toward home. The Kurdish parties of Rojhelat and its civil society, and the Kurds more broadly, share these same qualities under the Iranian regime. They have been suppressed and exiled; their region has been kept poor and underdeveloped; political executions and arrests remain widespread; their language and culture have been banned from formal education; their minerals and resources have been extracted while few public services are provided in return. Despite all of this, they still resist and fight for the freedom and liberation of their land. 

Odysseus is well known for his loyalty to home and family. The Kurds’ loyalty to their culture, language, and homeland, and their desire to exercise their internationally recognized right to self-determination, is another feature that supports the comparison with Odysseus. Interestingly, the idea for the Trojan horse is credited to Odysseus. The Kurds, too, are credited with the idea behind the SDF’s role in defeating ISIS, and could bring the same capabilities to bear in liberating their land in the conflict with Iran. However, they should never allow themselves to be used as the Trojan horse of others; instead, they should build and lead a single army, drawn from all Kurdish parties and some non-Kurdish individuals, to fight the Iranian regime only once their future gains are guaranteed. Their liberation movement should also remain confined to Kurdish-majority cities. 

But resilience alone is not what makes Odysseus “the man of many turns.” His defining trait is mêtis (cunning intelligence), the ability to out-think rather than out-fight an opponent. This is where the Kurdish story becomes more than a tale of suffering. The SDF itself was a strategic invention in case of Rojava if it did not act as a mere Trojan horse of war against ISIS and was not tribal oriented, Pak idea of decolonialization is another turn of Kurdish mêtis, PJAK’s articulation of a decentralization while is an imaginary one, other parties support of federal system, and new waves of national awareness that seeks decolonialization of Kurdistan are the moves of an actor thinking several steps ahead, the way Odysseus schemes his way past the Cyclops, the Sirens, and Circe alike.

Turkey as Poseidon

In the story of Odysseus’s return home, Poseidon, the god of the sea, is his chief divine enemy and the primary antagonist throughout the journey. In the case of the Kurds, and the US-Israeli project of working with them to operate inside Iran, Turkey, as the influential regional power, plays the same role as Poseidon. Turkey played this same role against the Kurds in Rojava, in alliance with al-Sharaa and the US. Poseidon’s hostility began after Odysseus blinded Polyphemus, the Cyclops, to save his men; Polyphemus turned out to be Poseidon’s son.

Poseidon answered his son’s prayer point by point, wrecking Odysseus’s ships, scattering his crew, and prolonging his journey by years; every time Odysseus drew close to progress, Poseidon threw a storm or obstacle in his way, most dramatically destroying his raft after he left Calypso’s island. Turkey, similarly, has announced that it will support Iran and strike the Kurds, and may even establish a buffer zone inside Iran to stop them. Turkey’s opposition to the Kurds returning home, governing themselves, and securing a political status that would protect them from Turkish and Iranian aggression stems in part from its fear that Kurdish national awareness would spread to Turkey and other parts of Kurdistan.

As the various threads of this essay illustrate, the case of the Kurds of Rojhelat in the current war between the US-Israel and Iran reflects a multifaceted, complicated, and uncertain involvement in this conflict. The Kurds now find themselves caught between the warring sides, with the greatest pressure coming from Iran and its proxies, and Turkey acting as an indirect but influential actor in the war. There is serious uncertainty about the future of the war, and about how the Kurdish parties will absorb the shocks they currently face and how they would act.