THE PUNDIT

Egypt’s foreign policy for years has followed the “strategic balancing” doctrine, involving balanced relations with all great powers and strategic non-alignment. There are now indications that this approach may change.

As defined by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, strategic balancing is a doctrine under which Egypt maintains balanced relations with great powers, refrains from joining military alliances, and promotes the rule of state institutions over regional disorder in ways the ministry believes best serve Egypt’s foreign interests for the time being.

This doctrine has shaped Egypt’s conduct in nearby conflicts and regional crises. In Libya, Cairo backed the Libyan National Army in the civil war against Islamist militias while avoiding large-scale direct involvement. In Sudan, Egypt currently supports the Sudanese Armed Forces in the ongoing conflict against the RSF militias, also without large-scale direct involvement. In both cases, Cairo’s approach reflects the importance it places on stability along its immediate borders.

In terms of great-power politics, Egypt has maintained a strategic relationship with the United States since the 1970s, one that remains crucial to the region’s security architecture, with Washington designating Egypt a major non-NATO ally within its security framework. At the same time, Egypt maintains a solid partnership with Russia, including cooperation in certain defence areas and on peaceful nuclear reactors through Russia’s Rosatom.

Egypt also maintains a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, involving large-scale investments and infrastructure cooperation. This partnership is expected to expand, as defence cooperation between the two countries is rumored to have deepened since 2023.

Under pressure

Since Nasser’s era, and under Sadat and his successors, Egypt has constructed a foreign policy centered on national interest and respect for Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Especially given the strong alliance between Israel and the United States, Cairo has sought to secure its territory and prioritize its national interest.

On that note, Egypt has maintained an important security arrangement with Israel while safeguarding American security interests in the region without compromising Egyptian national security. One source of strain in the relationship dates back to 2011, when many Egyptian policymakers concluded that Washington’s handling of Mubarak’s departure left Egypt dangerously exposed to the regional turmoil that followed. The removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013 led the United States to freeze parts of its economic and military aid to Egypt.

These two episodes marked an early turning point in what has since become a more transactional and occasionally tense relationship. Egypt then began to diversify its arms imports, including from Russia, prompting the United States to threaten sanctions over Egypt’s purchase of Russian Su-35 jets.

The Gaza war further intensified these tensions. Israel’s expanded military activity heightened security concerns in Cairo, which repeatedly raised the issue with the United States and pushed for a ceasefire, a process that took two years to succeed.

Furthermore, President Trump, early in his second term, announced his intention to take control of the Gaza Strip, signaling the forced displacement of its population—an issue Egypt repeatedly declared unacceptable. As a result, President Sisi delayed multiple visits to the White House, becoming the last major Arab leader to meet with Trump, who briefly visited Sharm El-Sheikh for the signing of the Gaza Peace Summit in October 2025.

With Israel’s expanding military behavior in the region and the technological gap between the IDF and the Egyptian army widening in Israel’s favor, Cairo is arguably pursuing advanced defense partnerships, including with Russia, China, and France, particularly in light of Washington’s unwillingness to narrow that military gap within the region’s security framework.

During Egypt’s foreign minister’s meeting with President Putin in Moscow last week, Putin announced his intention to build Egypt into a center for grains and energy in the future, serving as an alternative amid current disruptions. He also officially invited President Sisi to Moscow, marking Sisi’s eighth visit since taking office in 2014.

The timing of the invitation reflects Egyptian frustration with American approaches in the Middle East since 2011, with the current U.S.-Israeli war on Iran severely affecting Egypt’s energy imports and straining its already fragile economy.

New Sunni axis

In recent months, diplomatic contact among Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar has become notably more frequent. This pattern has included ministerial meetings as well as President Erdogan’s visits to these capitals.

There has been growing speculation about whether these contacts could evolve into a more structured regional alignment, though this was subsequently denied by Egypt’s foreign ministry, despite close cooperation among these countries in meetings preceding the Gaza Peace Summit, which ended the war in October 2025.

During the current conflict in the Gulf, these countries have come together again in an effort to de-escalate tensions, holding meetings in Islamabad before the conflict escalates to targeting energy infrastructure in the region.

Turkey, which appears to be the most forward-leaning actor in pushing this coordination into a more visible regional framework, has invested considerable diplomatic effort in repairing its relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt after tensions arose following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Turkey and the fall of the Turkish-backed Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt.

At minimum, the logic behind such alignment appears to center on containing regional instability and responding to the perception of growing Israeli freedom of action after October 7.

Israeli officials have already expressed concern about Turkish military-industrial expansion and the growing expansion of the Egyptian military, particularly the build-up in the Sinai Peninsula, as a result of Israeli operations in Gaza. Israeli officials have also expressed frustration with Saudi Arabia over its repeated refusal to normalize relations with Israel before the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The potential weight of such a framework lies in the different assets its members would bring. Saudi Arabia offers financial backing, oil leverage, and religious influence. Egypt contributes demographic weight, military scale, and longstanding political influence in Arab affairs, and remains the only state to have forced Israel to cede land. Pakistan adds nuclear deterrent value, a large military establishment, and broader political relevance. Qatar offers financial resources, natural gas leverage, and mediation capacity. In theory, such a grouping could contribute to a more balanced regional order.

However, it may not be straightforward for these countries to commit to a common foreign policy. Egypt and Turkey have only recently moved past a severe rupture that nearly escalated into conflict in Libya in 2019. At the same time, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan face significant economic challenges, including inflation and foreign currency constraints.

Pakistan and Egypt are also burdened by high levels of debt. The viability of such an arrangement will depend on whether Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan can agree on a leadership structure and overcome their economic constraints—something that may be possible if Qatar and Saudi Arabia provide financial support or investment.

In addition, Turkey appears to maintain a more expansionist regional posture. It has extended its footprint through military bases in Somalia and western Libya, as well as offshore drilling activities near Libya and Cyprus, which heightened tensions with Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece in 2019.

Turkey’s more activist posture could therefore generate friction if other members perceive the arrangement as a vehicle for Turkish power projection. More broadly, each of Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt retains the capacity to confront Israel independently.

What may tip the balance in favor of such an alignment is what many regional actors increasingly perceive as Washington’s strong alignment with Israel’s post-October 7 agenda. This dynamic could also unravel the project if the United States reduces its support for Israeli military activity, especially given that all three countries maintain significant security ties with Washington.

Egypt’s strategic trade-offs

Despite being one of the region’s oldest states, with a diverse—though debt-burdened—economy and a formidable, battle-tested military, Egypt faces a unique strategic dilemma. Since the late 1970s, following the Camp David Accords, Egypt has maintained close security cooperation with the United States and Israel. This arrangement has implicitly relied on constraints on Israeli military activity in the region.

Among the benefits Egypt has received from this model has been economic support, including access to debt markets and international financial institutions.

However, as Israel and the United States reshape regional security dynamics, Egypt faces a strategic trade-off: stepping beyond the American security framework to counter Israeli expansion risks losing critical economic support, while remaining within it increasingly exposes Egypt to a more assertive Israeli posture that challenges longstanding regional understandings.

The question for Cairo is no longer whether it prefers strategic balancing. It is whether the regional order still allows it.