Deterrence Lessons from the Middle East: Why Capability Alone Is Not Enough?

Deterrence is one of the most distinctive and important concepts in international affairs. What makes it unique is that it is defined relative to each state’s policy. The main objectives of deterrence strategies are to prevent an attack by an adversary for as long as possible, compel an adversary to end their ongoing assault, and prevent an open escalation with an adversary.

These strategies could involve measures such as maintaining an overall superior military force, possessing a specific deterrent weapon, and possessing economic leverage over an adversary. The crucial point is to possess the capability to inflict unbearable damage on an adversary, a concept known as deterrence by punishment. When this is the case, the adversary, presumed to be a rational actor, is theoretically deterred from carrying out an attack.

An example of deterrence would be the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which never escalated to direct full-scale warfare partly because both sides possessed nuclear weapons, thereby ensuring mutually assured destruction for both sides and deterring a full-scale attack by either side against the other.

The article explores deterrence by punishment and argues that regardless of how effective deterrence appears to be from the deterring actor’s perspective, the success of the deterrence model ultimately depends on the adversary’s response rather than the deterring actor’s capabilities alone. The article uses the American model of deterrence in the Middle East as an example of how deterrence models can be challenged and reinforced.

Deterrence Relative to the Distribution of Power

As mentioned above, deterrence is relative, and a significantly weaker state can still effectively deter a more powerful state. Deterrence can take the form of two or more states that can inflict similar levels of unbearable damage on each other, thereby deterring each other. This is referred to as symmetric deterrence, as demonstrated in the Cold War.

However, deterrence can be asymmetric, involving a weaker actor that has acquired the means to deter a more powerful adversary. This is common in the Middle East, where Israel maintains asymmetric deterrence over its regional adversaries using its nuclear deterrent and qualitative military edge. Iran also maintains asymmetric deterrence over its regional adversaries through a network of allied armed groups and advanced missile and drone capabilities.

Despite the presence and the apparent effectiveness of deterrence models in the region, Iran was attacked twice in less than one year, and Israel was attacked by Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. However, both states have attempted to re-establish regional deterrence through an important aspect of deterrence theory, which involves using military force in a way that first compels the adversary to abandon its assault, and then discourages future attacks by reinforcing the expectation that they will produce unbearable costs for the adversary.

When Does Deterrence Fail?

Deterrence fails for reasons related to the deterring actor and the adversary, or both. For the deterring actor, deterrence could fail if the deterring actor is not prepared to respond with equal or greater force to maintain its deterrence strategy, whether offensively to preserve deterrence or defensively to re-establish deterrence.

To maintain deterrence, the deterring actor must be prepared to use force not just to prevent an attack by the adversary, but also to ensure the adversary does not acquire the means to alter the current deterrence balance in the first place.

At the same time, if the adversary undermines the current deterrence balance, that challenge needs to be met with greater force to deter further attempts by the adversary.

Therefore, if a deterring actor has established a deterrence model but refuses to enforce it when tested, then deterrence is likely to fail.

However, the success of deterrence depends not only on the effectiveness of the deterring actor, but also on the adversary’s definition of rationality. Under the rational actor assumption mentioned above, a rational, theoretically deterred adversary is unlikely to attack the deterring actor if the political, economic, and military consequences are indeed unbearable.

However, the factors that determine what qualifies as rational or irrational differ from one actor to another. Among these factors are national pride, ideology, and policy considerations related to state strategy.

An example that combines both sets of factors is the October 7 attack on Israel, which can be viewed by some Palestinians as a mere act of resistance against an occupying force, but it can also be viewed as a calculated step that would trigger a chain reaction of regional conflicts, ending with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as shown when major European states recently recognized an independent State of Palestine.

The success of a deterrence strategy depends almost as much on the adversary’s perception of deterrence as it does on the capability and resolve of the deterring actor.

The American Deterrence Umbrella

Like the American deterrence umbrella in Europe, which was previously aimed at protecting European allies against the Soviet Union and is currently aimed at protecting them against Russia, the American deterrence umbrella in the Middle East protects American allies in the region.

However, in the Middle East, there are three tiers of American allies. Tier A represents Israel, Tier B represents GCC states, and Tier C represents Turkey and Egypt. These tiers differ in the level of technological advancement available to each tier, with Israel allowed to order the latest American equipment, which allows it to maintain a qualitative military edge across the region.

GCC states in Tier B receive advanced American equipment and host US troops on their soil, but the equipment they receive is less advanced than the American equipment supplied to Israel.

Finally, Egypt and Turkey receive American military equipment that is less advanced than the equipment provided to Israel and GCC states.

This strategy is most evident in the air forces across the region, where Israel operates American F-35 stealth fighter jets and F-15 Strike Eagles; GCC states are permitted to acquire less advanced variants of F-15 jets and Block 70/72 F-16 jets; Egypt is allowed to purchase less advanced Block 50 F-16 jets. This uneven distribution of American military capabilities reduces the credibility of the United States’ deterrence umbrella in the Middle East and invites adversaries to challenge it.

At the same time, the recent conflict with Iran showed that GCC states depend almost entirely on the presence of US troops to defend their territories. This created a dilemma for the United States, which was forced to respond to deterrence tests in Europe following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and in the Middle East during the Gaza War and the conflict with Iran.

This overextension strained American stockpiles, including missile interceptors and other munitions, exposing the American deterrence umbrella across Europe, Israel, and GCC states simultaneously. Furthermore, the rationing of remaining American munitions and interceptors in favor of Israel left GCC allies and Ukraine increasingly defenseless, thereby lowering the strategic utility of America’s deterrence umbrella. However, the GCC states’ lack of collective or individual response to Iran’s attacks reinforces the argument that deterrence without the will to respond to threats is ineffective.

The current status of America’s Middle East deterrence umbrella is unclear, but recent developments suggest it may need major restructuring. Between 2023 and 2026, almost all of the United States’ principal allies in the region were attacked. This included an attack by Israel, a US security partner, on Qatar, another US security partner, in September 2025. In addition, as a result of the US’s strategy of rationing missile interceptors, some GCC states are now buying air-defense interceptors from other suppliers.

At the same time, the US’s unequal treatment of allies encouraged Egypt to turn to Russia, France, and potentially China to upgrade its air force, and compelled Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to establish a mutual defense pact to enhance collective deterrence and provide members with a Pakistani nuclear backstop.

Even Israel has announced its long-term intention to reduce its dependence on American weaponry.

These developments reflect the difficulties faced by the United States and its security partners in responding to breaches of the current regional deterrence model. These difficulties may lead to the gradual erosion of the American deterrence model in the Middle East if its weaknesses are not addressed.

Deterrence is not an absolute concept. Therefore, it faces threats and challenges as time passes and national priorities shift.

Evidence from the conflicts in the Middle East since the October 7 attack confirms that even a theoretically deterred adversary can still attack the actor seeking to deter it, regardless of the consequences. This supports the argument that the endurance of deterrence depends on both the deterring actor and the adversary.

The conflicts in the Middle East also show that visible weaknesses in a deterrence model, such as the uneven distribution of military capabilities, can lead to credibility problems that can weaken it. More importantly, the article has shown that deterrence cannot protect a deterring actor under attack if that actor does not use its deterrent capabilities to reinforce deterrence.