Egypt’s Yemen Dilemma: Between Saudi Security and Israeli Intervention

The visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Cairo on September 15 cannot be understood without revisiting an earlier episode: President Donald Trump’s telephone call with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on April 1, 2025, during the American military campaign against Yemen’s Houthis.

Weeks earlier, leaked Signal messages among senior Trump administration officials had revealed Washington’s expectations of Cairo. One official indicated that the United States would soon clarify what it expected from Egypt and Europe in return for its military operation. Trump subsequently discussed the campaign with Sisi, while Cairo publicly emphasized that restoring stability in the Red Sea required broader regional de-escalation. Egypt did not join the American bombing campaign.

The underlying dilemma was straightforward. Egypt had an obvious economic interest in restoring navigation through Bab al-Mandeb and reviving Suez Canal revenues. Yet military participation risked drawing Cairo into another regional conflict without necessarily addressing its underlying causes.

Seventeen months later, the dilemma has returned under far more dangerous circumstances.

Saudi Arabia’s security predicament

The latest Houthi offensive has dramatically altered the military situation in Yemen. Saudi-backed forces have lost important positions along the Red Sea coast, while the Houthis have expanded their control over territory surrounding Bab al-Mandeb. Missile and drone attacks have also brought the conflict directly into Saudi territory.

The strategic implications extend well beyond Yemen. With navigation through the Strait of Hormuz already severely disrupted by the war with Iran, Saudi Arabia has become increasingly dependent on its East-West Pipeline and Red Sea export facilities. Threats to these alternatives could further undermine the kingdom’s energy exports and disrupt international oil markets.

Riyadh has consequently sought American military intervention. Mohammed bin Salman called Trump twice on September 10, urging strikes against the Houthis. Trump declined, although Washington has continued providing intelligence and targeting assistance.

The American response has created a difficult strategic environment for Saudi Arabia. The kingdom faces an escalating threat while its principal security partner remains unwilling, at least for now, to open another direct military front.

The newly announced Mecca Alliance, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, offers another potential framework for cooperation. Yet the absence of established joint command structures and clearly defined operational commitments raises questions about its capacity to respond to an immediate crisis.

Against this backdrop, Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Cairo acquires particular significance.

The Egyptian presidency confirmed that Sisi expressed support for Saudi measures to protect the kingdom’s security and stability. Both leaders also emphasized freedom of navigation through the Red Sea and the need for a sustainable political settlement in Yemen.

Whether Riyadh requested Egyptian military assistance remains unclear. Nevertheless, the timing of the visit makes security coordination a central question.

The Israeli complication

An additional dimension could make Egypt’s calculations considerably more complicated.

On September 15, Axios reported that senior military commanders from the United States, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and several Gulf states had attended a private meeting in Germany organized by US Central Command. CENTCOM subsequently confirmed the gathering, saying participants discussed regional security cooperation.

More significantly, Israel and Saudi Arabia were exploring possible Israeli assistance against the Houthis, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support.

The report does not establish that any agreement has been reached. Nor is there evidence that Saudi Arabia presented Egypt with an ultimatum.

It nevertheless introduces a consequential possibility: Cairo could find itself facing not simply a Saudi request for assistance, but a broader choice between closer involvement in Saudi security and the prospect of expanding Israeli participation in the Red Sea conflict.

Such an arrangement would raise questions about the emerging regional security architecture, particularly the relationship between Arab states, Israel and the United States in the confrontation with Iran.

For Saudi Arabia, the immediate concern is protecting its territory, energy infrastructure and economic lifelines. For Egypt, the considerations extend to Suez Canal revenues, relations with Riyadh, the risk of military entanglement and the future balance of power around the Red Sea.

These interests overlap, but they are not identical.

The limits of a military solution

Egypt’s possible responses span a wide spectrum, from political and intelligence cooperation to maritime security operations or direct military involvement.

One potential approach would combine intensified communication with Tehran and the Houthis with clearly defined security objectives: preventing attacks on Saudi territory and critical energy infrastructure, protecting navigation through Bab al-Mandeb, and containing the conflict without committing Egyptian ground forces inside Yemen.

Such an approach would still face considerable obstacles. Diplomatic engagement would offer no guarantee against further attacks, while limited military involvement could create pressures for deeper intervention if initial objectives were not achieved.

There is also a fundamental political question that military planning alone cannot resolve.

Iran provides the Houthis with important military and technological assistance, and the movement has become an increasingly consequential component of Tehran’s regional network. Yet reducing the Houthis to a mere Iranian proxy obscures their origins as a Yemeni political and religious movement, their historical grievances and the domestic conflicts that enabled their rise.

Any durable settlement would therefore have to address both dimensions: the regional confrontation involving Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Yemen’s unresolved struggle over political authority, representation and the distribution of power.

This is the larger dilemma confronting Cairo. Egypt’s economic and security interests are directly threatened by the Houthi offensive, while deeper military involvement could expose it to a prolonged war. Staying outside the conflict, meanwhile, would not necessarily insulate it from the consequences of Saudi insecurity or an expanded Israeli role.

Egypt is no longer confronting a choice between intervention and non-intervention alone. It is confronting the possibility that either course could carry consequences for the regional balance of power.