Deterrence and influence in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement

Signed on Friday, August 7, The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) represents the latest development in the geopolitical storm that has engulfed the region since the events of October 7, 2023. Echoing NATO’s article 5, the agreement states that an attack on any of the members in the agreement will be considered an attack on all. By signing it, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia commit themselves to a broader act of deterrence in the region, despite Turkey being a member of NATO – the world’s largest defense framework– and Saudi Arabia, being party to a defense pact with Pakistan that includes the use of Pakistani nuclear arsenal if deemed necessary. 

The agreement in its current format suggests these three states are seeking an outcome only they can provide to each other, that is likely a combination of military, political, and economic benefits that each state is uniquely positioned to offer the others, even if these three nations do not share the same strategic adversary. This makes the MJDA a regional deterrence message as opposed to a targeted defense agreement such as NATO.

Why Now?

Historically, Joint defense agreements or military pacts begin taking shape in times of uncertainty and instability. Since October 7, the Middle East faced a chain reaction of developments that persist until today. Israel’s violent conduct in Gaza and the lack of enforcement of international laws which Israel violated has likely triggered a security dilemma across the region, given that Israel attacked Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and Qatar. 

Historically, the United States played a central role in encouraging negotiations or containing escalations between Israel and Hamas. However, the scale of Israeli military activity in the region, paired with the American lawmakers’ encouragement of Israeli actions may have led its neighbors to question whether the US could still be relied upon as a de-escalatory force.

At the same time, with civil war raging in Sudan, and to a lesser degree in Yemen, the UAE’s role in both the conflicts is under more scrutiny than ever. In Yemen, for example, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Yemen have risen sharply over UAE’s alleged support of the Southern Transitional Council, which continued to seize land from the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and threatening Saudi borders according to a Saudi defense spokesman. Finally In Sudan, UAE’s alleged support of the Rapid Support Militias (RSF), which continues to commit war crimes in Sudan, has been implicitly rejected by both Saudi Arabia, and Turkey who continue to express their sympathies and commit military and economic resources to the National Sudanese Army.

Finally, the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States, has created more instability and regional spillover, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, already attacked by Iranian missiles and drones, especially Saudi Arabia which faces a semi-blockade on its oil exports from Iranian-backed Houthis in addition to the tensions at the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan secured diplomatic victory by mediating a memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran even if the document could be interpreted as a favorable outcome for Iran. This reinforces the need for a new deterrence mechanism that would effectively preserve their economic interests, de-escalate regional conflicts, and defend the members from foreign attacks.

Diverging Motives, Shared Deterrence

Based on the chain of events above, we can assess that Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have reasons related to regional deterrence, while Pakistan aims to solidify its diplomatic resurgence in the region. 

Individually, each state has a different adversary they aim to deter, besides political, and economic considerations. Saudi Arabia appears to have a tactical objective from this agreement, which is to deter Iran, the nation which has repeatedly attacked its energy infrastructure and threatened to paralyze the Kingdom’s economy. KSA also plans to employ the agreement to contain the Houthi threat, which also attacked KSA’s energy infrastructure multiple times in the last ten years, and is currently constraining KSA’s Red Sea backup energy supply route through Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

Turkey, however, appears to view the MJDA through the lens of its strategic rivalry with Israel. Since October 7, Israeli and Turkish politicians including Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Erdogan have engaged in hostile rhetorical escalation, especially after Israeli strikes on Turkish operated bases in Syria in 2025. Aside from the tensions between both states, Turkey and Israel share a mutual security dilemma.

On the one hand, Turkish diplomatic standing in the Muslim world is likely to have been affected by the failure to halt Israel’s offensives and violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. Furthermore, Turkey is directly threatened by Israel’s incursion and airstrikes in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime since Ankara remains the principal ally for Syria’s President Al-Sharaa. This makes Israel’s campaign in Syria, while not comparable to Gaza in scale, but still damaging to Turkish diplomatic image in the region.

On the other hand, a growing number of Israeli politicians consider Turkey as its principal post-Iran conflict adversary. Historically, Turkey has provided diplomatic cover for Hamas and its leaders, a situation which decision-makers in Tel Aviv saw threatening. But now, Turkish military presence in Syria and potentially in Gaza as part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) would place Turkish forces on Israel’s southwestern border in Gaza and northeastern border in Syria.

This could put Israel in an intolerable position, explaining why Israel quickly entered Syria and later attacked Turkish military installations in the country. Finally, the rapid growth in Turkish defense industries, especially in the UAVs sector is likely to add to Israel’s concerns about Turkey’s regional position.

Pakistan, once again at the center of events in the Middle East, stands to expand its growing influence in the region, after becoming the principal mediator in the conflict between Iran and the US, and signing a defense pact with Saudi Arabia in 2025. Furthermore, Pakistan aims to attract more investments from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This would be crucial help to the Pakistani economy, which has been suffering from rising debt levels, inflation, and unemployment. Taken together, Pakistan’s growing influence in the Middle East and the prospect of an economic recovery could enhance Pakistan’s position against its strategic adversary, India.

Deterrence or Counter-Alignment?

The idea of collective deterrence against regional threats appears plausible, but the MJDA may not achieve what it’s expected to deliver. To begin with, almost every country in the region either has been attacked or drawn into military readiness, therefore, announcing a defense agreement among three of the most influential actors in the region while the conflict is still ongoing may encourage rival states to harden their posture, to maintain their regional positioning. Furthermore, the complexity of the region’s geopolitics further complicates the responses of Iran and Israel to the MJDA. The agreement may create a sense of isolation in the region which may pressure Iran to enhance the capabilities of its allies in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. It may also provide an opening for UAE and Israel to expand their growing partnership into a formal military agreement. With Iron Dome equipment and operators reportedly stationed in UAE, it may not be a surprise if Israel and UAE decide to make their military partnership official. However, for Pakistan, the MJDA could prove costly if Israel decides to invite India into a military framework along with the UAE. Taken together, these possible outcomes would add more complexity to the region, likely leading to more conflict. The MJDA, while looking like a step in the right direction for regional deterrence and cooperation, may alienate other Arab or Muslim nations, with similar policy objectives and threat perceptions. If these alienated states consider an arrangement of their own, the region could face counter-alignment in the future. To make the MJDA more effective, its members may need to open the agreement to other states to maximize collective regional deterrence.

The MJDA is not a regional NATO, but a flexible deterrence message among states facing different threats. Its success will depend on whether it strengthens collective security without triggering new counter-alignments. To be effective, the agreement must balance military posture with diplomatic openness and regional inclusion.