Saudi Arabia Searches for Post-American Gulf Order

For decades, Gulf security rested on the simple assumption that the United States would deter Iran, protect energy flows, and contain regional wars before they reached Gulf capitals. The Iran war has exposed the limits of that assumption. Washington may still be militarily present, but Gulf states now fear that U.S. power can also import Israeli priorities into the region, escalate conflicts they opposed, and then leave them facing the consequences.

In this context, Saudi Arabia’s reported proposal for a Middle Eastern non-aggression pact with Iran presents an admission that the old regional security formula is breaking down. According to Financial Times, Riyadh is studying a Helsinki-style process with Iran. The step could be seen as part of a broader Saudi attempt to build a postwar architecture before the war’s aftermath hardens into a new cycle of retaliation.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act did not end the Cold War, nor did it create trust between the West and the Soviet bloc. It created rules of coexistence, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, refraining from force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-intervention. In the Middle East, where rival states often compete through militias, missiles, sabotage, and deniable attacks, even a limited agreement on these principles would be meaningful.

But the Saudi idea is also a sign of anxiety. Iran’s use of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, and its missile and drone threats against Gulf infrastructure, have reminded Gulf capitals that geography cannot be outsourced to Washington.

The deeper shift is that Saudi Arabia is trying to separate Gulf security from the logic of permanent confrontation. This does not mean Riyadh has become friendly toward Iran. It means it no longer sees maximal pressure, Israeli escalation, or exclusive dependence on the United States as sufficient tools for managing Iran. The 2023 Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iranian restoration of relations already pointed in this direction; to manage rivalary through channels rather than to leave it entirely to proxy conflict. The new proposal appears to extend that logic from bilateral détente to regional security design.

The obstacle is that there is no single Gulf position. The UAE appears to be drawing the opposite lesson from the war. Abu Dhabi has been hit hard by the logic of Iranian retaliation and has responded by tightening its security alignment with the United States and Israel, while also accelerating infrastructure meant to bypass Hormuz.

That divergence is now one of the central political facts of the Gulf. Saudi Arabia is trying to imagine a security order in which Iran is contained through guarantees, diplomacy, and regional balance. The UAE seems more inclined to build a harder deterrent network with Israel and the United States.

Israel’s widening military reach may become the strongest arguments for a Saudi-Iranian understanding. For many Arab and Muslim states, the problem is no longer confined to Iran’s missiles, proxies, or regional influence; it is also Israel’s repeated disruption of regional stability through war-making, the occupation of Palestine and other Arab territories, and continuing military operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

In this context, a Helsinki-style process would not simply be a mechanism to contain Iran. It would also reflect a growing regional desire to limit the capacity of Israel to drag the Middle East into wars that many Arab states did not choose. The more Israel is perceived as an unrestrained source of escalation, the more plausible a Saudi-Iranian non-aggression framework becomes as a tool to prevent the region from being reorganized around permanent Israeli military expansion.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia is not relying only on diplomacy. The reported expansion of the Saudi-Pakistani defense framework toward Turkey and Qatar suggests that Riyadh is pursuing two tracks at once; de-escalation with Iran and the construction of a Muslim-majority security bloc less dependent on the United States. Pakistan’s defense minister has spoken of expanding the Saudi-Pakistan pact to include Turkey and Qatar, framing it as a way to reduce external dependence. That signals that regional powers are preparing for a more multipolar security environment.

Riyadh is hedging against Iran’s revenge, Israel’s escalation, American unpredictability, Emirati divergence, and the possibility that the war leaves the Gulf with more insecurity rather than less. Its wager is that a wounded region needs rules before it needs another alliance. Saudi Arabia’s proposal identifies the right problem, but its success will depend on whether Riyadh can turn a defensive idea into an inclusive political process.