The Truth About Saudi Arabia’s Position on the Iran War

Last week, several international media outlets reported that President Trump had ended “Project Freedom,” a plan to secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, after Saudi Arabia refused to allow the United States to use its bases and airspace for the operation.

Two days later, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who led Saudi intelligence for more than two decades, wrote that Saudi Arabia had not fallen into what he described as an Israeli trap designed to ignite a war between the Arab Gulf states and Iran.

The following day, his argument was reinforced by a tweet by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson scathing the false news about the Saudi real position in the war and emphasizing de-escalation and negotiation as the proper path to ending the war.

This was not the first time Saudi officials had adopted a cautious position, denying that Riyadh had encouraged either war or escalation. On March 2, the spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington denied media reports claiming that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had lobbied for the war.

Yet the New York Times and the Washington Post continued publishing stories, often based on anonymous sources, suggesting that Saudi Arabia had played a role in supporting the war’s emergence and prolongation. The contradiction between these reports and Saudi official statements has left one central question unresolved: what is the truth about the Saudi position?

Answering this question is not easy. Several explanations remain possible. Changes in the leadership and staffing of Times and Post may have affected the integrity of such major American outlets and led them to be involved in misleading stories in favor of lobbyist groups. It is also possible that some sources deliberately fed these outlets distorted accounts in the interest of particular lobbying groups. A third possibility, however, should not be dismissed; that these stories were built around assumptions about Saudi Arabia’s de facto interests rather than clear evidence of its actual policy.

To examine that possibility, it is necessary to track Saudi foreign policy since October 2018, after the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. In the aftermath of that crisis, Mohammed bin Salman made significant changes to his entourage, and those changes had a visible impact on Saudi foreign policy. Riyadh’s regional conduct became more conservative, more strategic, and more cautious about costly confrontation.

Several developments reinforced this shift, particularly with regard to normalization with Israel and escalation against Iran. The Houthi attacks on Saudi and Emirati oil facilities in May and September 2019 were a turning point. Although the United States provided political support to Saudi Arabia, Riyadh’s expectations of direct American protection were not met. In the same period, Saudi Arabia had played a leading role in the formation of the Middle East Strategic Alliance, known as MESA, in partnership with the United States. But by 2019, Saudi enthusiasm for the project had diminished considerably.

The Saudis had initially viewed MESA as a potential security front against the Iranian threat. Yet the Gulf rift with Qatar, the absence of a unified regional vision, and uncertainty over the alliance’s real purpose limited its progress. Riyadh also feared that MESA could become a framework for normalization with Israel without meaningful progress toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The U.S. assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of Iran’s Quds Force, was another moment that shaped Saudi regional thinking. Although Saudi official media outlets celebrated the American strike, Riyadh was clearly concerned about the possibility of Iranian retaliation.

Saudi officials denied any role in the operation or prior consultation with Washington. The episode served as a warning that unilateral American moves could expose the region, and Saudi Arabia in particular, to severe instability. Then, in January 2021, Trump left the White House, and the Democrats returned with a more diplomatic approach toward Iran.

These experiences accumulated and shaped Saudi policy. Riyadh came to view normalization with Israel as a strategic card that should not be played without substantial compensation: either a credible path toward resolving the Palestinian question, or the establishment of a Saudi nuclear program that would include uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia did not wait for the Biden administration to revive the nuclear deal with Iran. Instead, it resumed relations with Tehran through the 2023 agreement brokered by China.

When Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Saudi Arabia sought to consolidate its bilateral economic, security, defense, and technological partnership with Washington. Yet it remained firm on the question of normalization with Israel. Riyadh wanted a deeper relationship with the United States, but it was not willing to spend its most valuable regional card without strategic returns.

The American-Israeli strikes against Iran in June 2025 left the Gulf states facing a clear reality: the United States prioritized Israeli security over Gulf security. Washington did not consult its Gulf partners before launching the strikes. In this context, the American-Israeli war that began on February 28, 2026, appears to have been viewed in Riyadh as an uncalculated gamble.

Saudi Arabia has an interest in changing Iran’s regional behavior. But Riyadh is also deeply concerned about how such change might happen, and what consequences it could produce. The United States entered the war in coordination with Israel, but failed to turn tactical gains into strategic outcomes. The Iranian regime did not collapse. Hardliners tightened their grip on power. The Strait of Hormuz was weaponized. The entire region entered a new phase in which Washington now finds itself negotiating, in effect, to return to the conditions that existed on February 27 regarding freedom of navigation in Hormuz.

In such a situation, Saudi Arabia’s priority is not escalation. Riyadh hopes that the United States can secure the best possible terms in any negotiation, limiting Iranian gains and establishing a more stable post-war regional security arrangement.

No one can fully explain the contradiction between American media reports about Saudi Arabia’s alleged role in the war and Saudi Arabia’s official declarations and actions. But Saudi interests and policy do not suggest that Riyadh wanted this war to begin, nor that it seeks escalation now. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia appears focused on negotiations and on ensuring that the United States obtains the strongest possible conditions for the regional order that will emerge after the war.

In other words, Riyadh has processed a difficult reality: a new regional order is being formed, and it will include the current Iranian regime. Saudi Arabia’s task is to deal with that reality, not deny it. This represents an unprecedented level of pragmatism in Saudi foreign policy.