Libya’s Turkey Deal Signals Saddam Haftar’s Rise

On October 20, 2026, the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), based in eastern Libya, endorsed the Turkish-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on maritime boundaries, signed in 2019 by the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) and Turkey.

The memorandum was part of a broader agreement that included military cooperation, paving the way for Turkish intervention to defend the GNA against Khalifa Haftar’s forces, which sought to capture Tripoli by military force in 2019–2020. The endorsement came as no surprise to observers of Libyan affairs, who had anticipated a dramatic shift in Haftar’s position toward Turkey following the replacement of the HoR speaker.

On October 6, 2026, the HoR elected new leadership in a surprise move. Replacing Aguila Saleh, the former speaker of the HoR, had long been a goal of various Libyan and international actors, given his role in obstructing the political process over the past 12 years. Saleh was an example of a transitional official who resisted every attempt to replace him.

The October 6 session was not the first attempt to elect new leadership for the HoR. Several attempts had been made since 2014, but all failed because of Saleh’s legal maneuvers, backed by Haftar’s military support. This time, however, Haftar allowed the process to move forward. Forces reportedly under the command of his son Khaled, the chief of staff of Haftar’s forces, had previously prevented lawmakers from meeting in Benghazi. Various reports have linked the change in Haftar’s position to the growing influence of his younger son and deputy, Saddam Haftar, who has increasingly represented his father in political and diplomatic engagements.

Saddam has engaged intensively with the Turkish government as part of Ankara’s rapprochement with Haftar. He visited Ankara three times in 2025, where he was received as a Libyan military official and met the Turkish defense minister, despite Turkey’s recognition of the government in Tripoli. Senior Turkish officials, including the intelligence chief, also visited Benghazi and held talks with Saddam and Khalifa Haftar.

These developments made the election of a new HoR speaker an important step toward endorsing the maritime MoU. Saleh, widely considered Egypt’s most important ally in eastern Libya, had strongly opposed the agreement for years. The new HoR speaker, Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi, belongs to the same Obeidat tribe as Saleh. More importantly, he previously chaired the Libyan-Turkish Parliamentary Friendship Committee and was actively engaged in bilateral relations.

The endorsement of the MoU is an important step reflecting Turkey’s growing influence in Libya, potentially at Egypt’s expense. But it may also be connected to the American proposal for Libya’s reunification. The reported US plan envisions a power-sharing arrangement between the Haftar and Dbeibah families, with Saddam Haftar appointed head of the Presidential Council while Abdul Hamid Dbeibah remains prime minister.

Turkey is Dbeibah’s closest foreign ally and holds considerable leverage over him. Endorsing the maritime MoU may therefore be the key to securing Turkish support for a deal that would allow Saddam Haftar and his forces to enter Tripoli without war.

At the same time, the entire maneuver has consolidated Saddam’s position among his brothers, particularly Khaled and Belqasim, the director of the Development and Reconstruction Fund, in the competition to succeed their father. Saleh’s removal also suggests that Saddam has become the closest to his father politically and is powerful enough to push a long-established figure like Saleh out of Libya’s political leadership in pursuit of his own ambitions.

It is too early to conclude that another strongman has emerged in Libya, or that the American power-sharing proposal is about to succeed. What is clear, however, is that Saddam Haftar’s political ambitions are growing, and it remains uncertain where those ambitions will lead Libya.