Egypt Joins Gaza Force under U.S.-Backed Ceasefire Plan

Egyptian military personnel have joined the International Stabilization Force for Gaza, according to images released by the Board of Peace, marking Cairo’s most visible step yet into the U.S.-backed security architecture planned for the postwar enclave.

“Egypt’s contributions will help the ISF scale up operations to create a safer & more secure Gaza,” said the official X account of the Board of Peace, “As a country sharing a border with Gaza, the participation & leadership of Egypt in this shared effort is critical to mission success.”

The move comes as Washington and its partners try to revive the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire plan, which links reconstruction and further Israeli withdrawal to the deployment of an international force, the training of Palestinian police, and arrangements for Hamas’s disarmament.

The U.S. State Department described Egypt’s role as crucial to the mission, saying Cairo’s contribution would support ISF operations aimed at strengthening stability and security in Gaza. The images showed Egyptian military personnel joining the force, while noting that Egypt is expected to serve as a core pillar of the mission because it borders Gaza and controls the Rafah crossing.

Since the beginning of discussions over an international force, Egypt has insisted that any deployment must be based on a United Nations mandate and Palestinian approval. In January, Diaa Rashwan, head of Egypt’s State Information Service, said Egypt would only take part in the ISF if it operated under a UN resolution and with Palestinian consent. He described the force’s role as separating Israeli forces, monitoring Israel’s gradual withdrawal, and overseeing buffer arrangements until a full pullout from Gaza.

That condition was partly met in November 2025, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan and authorizing the creation of a temporary International Stabilization Force under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. The resolution passed with 13 votes in favor, none against, and abstentions from Russia and China.

Yet Egypt’s entry into the force does not resolve the deeper political and operational disputes surrounding the mission. The ISF was designed to become the security backbone of Gaza’s transition, but months after its announcement, the project has struggled to attract substantial troop contributions. AP reported in late May that the planned 20,000-strong force remained largely stalled, with Indonesia putting its major troop pledge on hold and other countries offering only limited or unclear commitments.

Hamas wants thousands of its existing police personnel to be incorporated into any new security structure, while Israel rejects any role for Hamas-affiliated forces. Israeli troops still control more than half of Gaza, while Hamas continues to administer densely populated coastal areas where much of the displaced population is sheltering.

Egypt’s approach appears designed to avoid direct confrontation with Palestinian factions. Cairo has long argued that the force should focus on peacekeeping, border monitoring, humanitarian access, and the training of local Palestinian police, while leaving ultimate governance in Palestinian hands.

This Egyptian vision aborts the Israeli ambition to delegate its hard ambition to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure to other actors after months of Israeli indiscriminate bombing along with starving the Gazan population failed to get the job done.

This Israeli perspective was expressed in a Times of Israel blog commentary by analyst Amine Ayoub, who said that Egypt’s deployment exposes the weakness of the entire stabilization concept, because Cairo is willing to monitor crossings and withdrawal lines but not carry out “peace enforcement” against Palestinian armed groups. Ayoub argued that without a force willing to confront Hamas’s military infrastructure, the ISF risks becoming a symbolic buffer rather than an instrument capable of implementing the second phase of the ceasefire plan.

For Egypt, joining the ISF reinforces Cairo’s position as the indispensable Arab state in any Gaza settlement, gives Egypt influence over border security and postwar arrangements, and prevents rival regional actors from monopolizing the file. But it also exposes Egypt to accusations that it is helping enforce a U.S.-Israeli plan if the mission becomes associated with disarmament, internal policing, or the containment of Palestinians rather than reconstruction and sovereignty.